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COMMODITY PRICE FIXING AND THE SUPREME
COURT '-
HARRY POLIKOFF t
Recent decisions 2 of the Supreme Court of the United States,
in a number of cases involving marketing regulation and anti-trust
laws, convey a vivid picture of American enterprise today as an inter-
section of industry, agriculture and government.
It is not pertinent to debate here the extent to which government
should or should not "interfere with", "regulate" or "control" pri-
vate enterprise. However, it does appear pertinent to acknowledge the
general truth that in any human scheme there is a definite place for
leadership toward common good. Such leadership in business, for
example, may result in agreement to exhibit new automobile models
in Fall rather than in Spring, or to distinguish different qualities of
a single fruit by uniform nomenclature in grading. Leadership there
must be, if business is to minimize the hardships of innumerable com-
petitive practices which vary in degree from the annoying to the de-
structive.3 Straitjackets, however, must be avoided if initiative and
individuality are to thrive in the interest of invention and progress.
Industry often seeks to supply its own leadership by cooperative
effort, typical of which is the "association" technique of self govern-
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I. This article may be deemed a sequel and supplement to two earlier articles: Fin-
kelstein, From Munn v. Illinois to Tyson v. Banton (1927) 27 COL. L. REV. 769, 2 SE-
LECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1938) 516; Goldsmith and Winks, Price
Fixing: From Nebbia to Guffey (1936) 31 ILL. L. REV. 179, 2 SELECTED ESSAYS ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1938) 531. The historical discussion of the first article and
the analysis of certain state milk regulations in the second are especially valuable.
Special treatment is given in the instant article to commodity prices under decisions of
the Supreme Court of the United States during and since 1939, permitting herein paral-
lel discussion of current problems raised by recent marketing regulation, the anti-trust
laws and attendant economic considerations.
2. Mayo, etc. v. Lakeland Highlands Canning Co., Inc., 6o Sup. Ct. 517 (1940);
United States v. Borden Co., 6o Sup. Ct. 182 (1939) ; H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v.
United States, 307 U. S. 588 (1939) ; United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., Inc., 307
U. S. 533 (1939); Mulford v. Smith, 307 U. S. 38 (1939); Milk Control Board v.
Eisenberg Farm Products, 306 U. S. 346 (1939) ; see Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United
States, 6o Sup. Ct. 618 (1940) ; Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U. S. 208
(939); United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., Inc., U. S. Sup. Ct. May 6, 194o.
3. It has been aptly stated: "While it is true that 'fair competition is the life of
trade,' it is equally true that 'unfair and excessive competition' is death to trade ... "
Ware-Kramer Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., i8o Fed. i6o, 170 (D. N. C.
Igio).
(934)
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ment in trade and agriculture. However, two other major interests
are here at focus. The first rises from within: the minority non-
conformist who seeks immediate profit or expansion in refusal to co-
operate-often termed the chiseler. The second presses from without:
consumer interest, seeking its conception of the immediate minimum
in price and maximum in quantity or quality. Centuries ago these
very interests caused adoption of rules designed to minimize frauds
and other malpractices; today they are still stanchions of the vast web
of legislation constituting the relations between business and govern-
ment.
Late years find a third major force in such relationship: differ-
ence in bargaining power between producers or producer groups (urban
laborer or farmer) and management or management groups. From
Clayton and Capper to Wallace and Wagner is found growing con-
viction that the many weak should be given strength and afforded
opportunity, to meet the few strong, as part of the game in pursuit of
orderly marketing processes and public welfare.
Marketing regulation authorizing commodity price fixing, and
the anti-trust laws which prevent such price fixing, each constitute
different phases of governmental policy with the single objective to
reconcile conflicting interests in the economic structure. Commodity
prices affect the whole national economy, and constitute both cause
and effect of a myriad of influences therein. Major influences spring
from certain policies of business, government and the consuming pub-
lic, recent expressions of which may be tersely summarized thus: in-
dustry is said to accept the desirability of "a reasonable ideal of busi-
ness which partakes of both monopoly without its horns and compe-
tition without the cut-throat". 4 This is currently sought by the De-
partment of Justice through "our traditional case-by-case system of the
development of economic jurisprudence", 5 letting the courts determine
the combinations to be considered reasonable or unreasonable in vari-
ous industries. The view of a large part of the consuming public is
that "the answer . . . will lie in . . . breaking up monopolies or
regulating them". 6
Certain cases crucial in the fulfillment of these policies were de-
cided by the Supreme Court during and since 1939, and it is the pur-
pose of this article to give main consideration to such cases.
4. A. W. Robertson, Chairman of the Board, Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co.,
United States News, January 30, 1939, p. 14, cols. 3, 4.
5. Assistant Attorney General Thurman W. Arnold, Address to Denver Bar Asso-
ciation, May 15, 1939.
6. Editorial, The Philadelphia Record, August is, 1938.
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I. FEDERAL MARKETING LEGISLATION
United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative, Inc.7 marked the first
time that the Supreme Court was squarely confronted with the ques-
tion of whether Congress has peacetime 8 power to prescribe the price
of commodities moving in interstate commerce.
This question had been avoided, if not evaded, in the earlier case
of Carter v. Carter Coal Co.9 In this test of the first Guffey Act,10
which attempted to regulate certain labor relations and prices in the
soft coal industry, the majority of the court decided merely that the
labor provisions of the act were unconstitutional; that the price pro-
visions were inseparable from those respecting labor; and that in con-
sequence the statute as a whole was invalid. The concurring '- and
dissenting 12 jurists saw fit to speak unequivocally in support of the
power of Congress to fix prices for coal sold in interstate commerce.
However, it remained for the Rock Royal case to require the majority
of the Court to declare itself upon the subject. 13
In previous years many allied questions of federal power had
been before the Court; these earlier decisions may have furnished
clues, but not precedents. Federal legislation prescribing the price
of labor during an emergency period had been upheld 14; regulation
of the prices of railroad and pipeline carriage was sustained 15; and
the same is true of regulation of prices for various services of stock-
yards and of market agencies dealing in livestock.16 In these and other
cases arising under the interstate commerce clause, "commerce" was
deemed an activity rather than a thing or commodity. In fact, com-
merce has been variously defined as traffic, transportation or inter-
7. 307 U. S. 533 (1939). The same question was raised in the companion case of
H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 307 U. S. 588 (1939).
8. In Highland v. Russell Car & Snow Plow Co., 279 U. S. 253 (1929), the Court
sustained federal power to fix coal prices in time of war.
9. 298 U. S. 238 (1936).
io. Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, 49 STAT. 991 (1935), 15 U. S. C.
A. 801-827 (934).
ii. Mr. Chief Justice Hughes: "Whether the policy of fixing prices of commodi-
ties sold in interstate commerce is a sound policy is not for our consideration. The
question of that policy, and of its particular applications, is for Congress." Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 319 (1936).
12. Mr. Justice Cardozo: "To regulate the price for such transactions is to regu-
late commerce itself, and not alone its antecedent conditions Dr its ultimate conse-
quences." Id. at 326.
13. Cf. United States v. David Buttrick Co., 91 F. (2d) 66 (C. C. A. Ist, 1937),
cert. denied, 302 U. S. 737 (1937). The district courts of New York and Massachu-
setts, from which were taken the appeals decided in the Rock Royal and Hood cases,
respectively, reached opposite conclusions.
14. Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332 (1917). For fixing of coal prices in emergency,
see Highland v. Russell Car & Snow Plow Co., 279 U. S. 253 (1929).
15. The Pipe Line Cases, 234 U. S. 548 (1914). Upon regulation of gas and elec-
tric utilities, see Electric Bond & Share Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission,
303 U. S. 419 (1938).
16. Acker v. United States, 298 U. S. 426 (1936); Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v.
United States, 28o U. S. 42o (1930). Cf. Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495 (922).
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course,17 or as the purchase, sale and exchange of commodities 's
rather than their production or manufacture.
Thus, the course of decision had left an open question as to
whether prices paid to producers at the point of production for com-
modities ultimately shipped in interstate commerce constituted part of
such commerce. Nevertheless, it would seem that the price of milk,
moving in interstate commerce, is even more closely related to such
commerce than the price of storage space or services in the handling,
within a state, of the cows which produce such milk, 9 and more closely
related than the labor problems of persons, within a state, handling
such milk movement.
20
The power of states to prescribe prices, both for activities and
commodities, had been before the Supreme Court on numerous occa-
sions. Prices for activities or services prescribed by state regulation
were sustained as to railroad charges, 21 warehouse storage and handling
rates for grain 22 and tobacco, 23 commissions for selling insurance, 24
insurance premiums, 2 5 emergency rentals 28 and minimum wages for
women,27 but were held invalid as to employment 28 and ticket 2 9 agency
fees. The prices of commodities such as water, gas and electricity
were sustained as a valid regulation of public utilities ;30 but beyond
this category of commodity price regulation, legislation respecting gas-
oline has been invalidated ' and only that respecting milk upheld.
32
Though precedent for federal regulation of ordinary commodity
prices was lacking, federal authority to regulate activities affecting com-
17. See Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282, 290 (1921);
Blumenstock Bros. Adv. Agency v. Curtis Pub. Co., 252 U. S. 436, 442 (192o); Hoke
and Economides v. United States, 227 U. S. 308, 320 (1913); Gibbons v. Ogden, 9
Wheat. I, 76 (U. S. 1824).
I8. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 297 (1936) ; Hammer v. Dagenhart,
247 U. S. 251, 272 (1918).
ig. Acker v. United States, 298 U. S. 426 (1936); Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v.
United States, 28o U. S. 42o (1930).
20. National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. I
(1937).
21. Peik v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry., 94 U. S. 164 (1876).
22. Brass v. North Dakota, 153 U. S. 39I (1894) (monopoly lacking); Munn v.
Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1876) (monopoly).
23. Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U. S. 441 (I937).
24. O'Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U. S. 251 (931).
25. German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389 (1914).
26. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135 (192).
27. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937).
28. Tyson v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418 (1927).
29. Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350 (1928).
3o. Driscoll v. Edison Light & Power Co., 307 U. S. 104 (1939); Spring Valley
Water Works v. Schottler, HO U. S. 347 (1884).
31. Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U. S. 235 (ig29) ; cf. New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262 (1932), wherein was set aside a state statute requiring that
persons engaging in the ice business procure certificates of public convenience.
32. Hegeman Farms Corp. v. Baldwin, 293 U. S. 163 (1934) (prices paid by milk
dealers to milk producers); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 (1934) (prices
charged by milk dealers).
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modity prices had been sustained time and again. Every activity involved
in the federal legislation above noted affected the cost of operations in
the regulated enterprise; wages, freight rates and stockyard charges
are certainly, though ultimately, reflected in the prices 33 of commodi-
ities hauled or handled through regulated facilities. Even more direct
is the effect upon ordinary commodity prices of such federal legisla-
tion as the Sherman Act,34 prohibiting trade restraints; the Federal
Trade Commission Act,35 prohibiting unfair methods of competition;
the Grain Futures Acts 36 regulating certain grain trading; and the
Robinson-Patman Act,37 prohibiting price discriminations. Thus,
prior to the Rock Royal case many decisions had sustained federal
power under the interstate commerce clause to affect commodity prices
by regulating or prescribing costs and price practices. State laws with
the same effect are legion.38
The recent case of Mulford v. Smith 39 was a forerunner of the
Rock Royal decision; here a divided court sustained sections of the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 40 authorizing the Secretary to
establish marketing quotas for tobacco shipped in interstate commerce.
It is a matter of common knowledge that in the absence of price re-
straint a relation generally exists between price on the one hand, and
supply and demand on the other; that the volume of a commodity
directly affects the price thereof. Nevertheless, in this case federal
authority over commerce was held to extend to marketing therein, and
to the volume of commodity movement through such marketing chan-
nels. The minority opinion regarded the statute in contravention of
the Constitution as a regulation of production 11 rather than of inter-
state commerce.42  Likewise, state regulation of oil production has
been held valid under the police power,4 3 and has been supplemented
by federal legislation prohibiting shipment in interstate commerce of
oil produced in violation of such state laws.
44
33. In Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495, 515 (1922), the Court observed: "Ex-
penses incurred in the passage through the stockyards necessarily reduce the price
received by the shipper, and increase the price to be paid by the consumer."
34. 26 STAT. 209 (I89O), I5 U. S. C. A. § 1-7 (,927).
35. 38 STAT. 717 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. §§4I-51 (1927).
36. 42 STAT. 998 (1922), 7 U. S. C. A. §§ 1-17 (939). See Chicago Board of
Trade v. Olsen, 262 U. S. I (1923).
37. 49 STAT. 1526 (936), i5 U. S. C. A. H3 13, 21a (Supp. 1939).
38. Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U. S. i57 (1912). Such state stat-
utes vary in nature from the traditional Anti-Trust Laws to the more novel measures
prohibiting sales below cost. See ZORN AND FELDMAN, BusINESS UNDER THE NEW
PRICE LAws (i937) ; Note (i939) ii8 A. L. R. 5o6.
39. 307 U. S. 38 (I939).
40. 52 STAT. 31 (938), 7 U. S. C. A. §§ 1281-1407 (i939), I6 U. S. C. A. §§ 59o-h,
590-0 (Supp. 1939).
41. Cf. United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. i (1936).
42. Mulford v. Smith, 307 U. S. 38, 5, ('939).
43. See Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., 300 U. S. 55, 69 (937).
44. Connally Hot Oil Act, 49 STAT. 30 (i935), i5 U. S. C. A. § 7,5 (,939).
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To this background replete with authorities on federal regulation
of the cost or price of certain activities in interstate commerce, state
regulation of prices of activities and the commodity milk, and federal
and state regulation of price practices and commodity volume, must be
added decisions of the Court containing dicta bearing upon federal
power over commodity prices under the commerce clause.
45
The Rock Royal decision was heralded by the opinion of the
Court rendered only a few months before in Milk Control Board v.
Eisenberg Farm Products.46 The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
sought to enjoin the defendant milk dealer, operator of a milk-gather-
ing station in Pennsylvania buying its entire supply within the state
from local producers for shipment to and resale in New York, from
making such milk purchases at producer prices below the minimum
prescribed for all milk dealers by authority of the Milk Control Board
Law. Mr. Justice Roberts, speaking for the majority of the Court,
held:
45. Over sixty years ago, in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1876), the Court sus-
tained a state measure requiring grain warehousemen to procure a license, revocable
upon violation by charges in excess of the maximum prescribed in the act for storing
and handling grain. Said the Court:
"The controlling fact is the power to regulate at all. If that exists, the right to
establish the maximum of charge, as one of the means of regulation, is implied."
Id. at 134.
This ruling in respect to state authority would, if applied to federal power, clearly indi-
cate that the power to regulate interstate commerce included the right to prescribe
charges in such commerce. However, it remained for later dicta to clarify whether
such right applied not only to activities or services but also to commodities moving in
commerce. In Lemke v. Farmers Grain Co., 258 U. S. 50 (1922), the Court invalidated
a North Dakota statute which empowered the state grain inspector to determine the
margin of profit realized by buyers upon their purchases of grain shipped to other
states. The opinion included the following dictum:
"It is alleged that such legislation is in the interest of the grain growers and essen-
tial to protect them from fraudulent purchases, and to secure payment to them of
fair prices for the grain actually sold. This may be true, but Congress is amply
authorized to pass measures to protect interstate commerce if legislation of that
character is needed." Id. at 6o.
In Public Utilities Commission v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., 273 U. S. 83 (1927),
the Court, again divided, refused to sustain state prescribed rates for electricity pro-
duced and sold within the state but delivered at the state line for transmission and use
within an adjoining state. Both the majority and dissenting opinions include dicta
based on federal power over such rates, the former asserting that ". . . if such regu-
lation is required it can only be attained by the exercise of the power vested in Con-
gress." Id. at go. In Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U. S. 511 (1935), the opin-
ion was unanimous in invalidating a provision of the Milk Control Law of New York
forbidding sale within the state of milk purchased in other states at prices below the
minimum prescribed in New York. The Court stated:
"If New York, in order to promote the economic welfare of her farmers, may
guard them against competition with the cheaper prices of Vermont, the door has
been opened to rivalries and reprisals that were meant to be averted by subjecting
commerce between the states to the power of the nation." Id. at 522.
The Court also remarked that
"If farmers or manufacturers in Vermont are abandoning farms or factories, or
are failing to maintain them properly, the legislature of Vermont and not that of
New York must supply the fitting remedy." Id. at 524.
46. 306 U. S. 346 (I939). See Polikoff, State Police Regulation of Persons Deal-
ing in Interstate Commerce (1939) 44 DiCm. L. REV. i, for a discussion comparing this
with earlier decisions of the Court under the commerce clause. See also (1939) 27
CAL. L. REv. 615.
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in matters requiring diversity of treatment according to
the special requirements of local conditions, the states remain free
to act within their respective jurisdictions until Congress sees fit
to act in the exercise of its overriding authority. . . . These
considerations we think justify the conclusion that the effect of
the law on interstate commerce is incidental and not forbidden by
the Constitution, in the absence of regulation by Congress." 47
Thus, state power to prescribe prices for milk purchased by a dealer
within the state for shipment to and resale in another state was herein
conditioned upon the absence of federal regulation. To have denied
any such Congressional power over milk prices after the Eisenberg
decision would have negatived the very basis of that case.
Against this background, it is important to examine the basis of
the decision in the Rock Royal case. This case accomplished for fed-
eral jurisdiction that which Nebbia v. New York 48 determined for
state jurisdiction, where for the first time, the Court sustained com-
modity price regulation of an industry not "clothed with a public
interest" in the traditional sense.49  It is significant that the opinion
in the Rock Royal case often referred to the Nebbia case; and that in
both cases the power to prescribe prices was sustained with respect to
the same commodity-milk.
Effective September I, 1938, the United States Secretary of
Agriculture promulgated Order No. 27, regulating such handling of
milk in the New York Metropolitan area as was in, burdening, obstruct-
ing or affecting interstate commerce. This action was taken by the
Secretary pursuant to the terms of the Agricultural Marketing Agree-
ment Act of 1937,50 which, with respect to milk, authorized orders
"fixing, or providing a method for fixing, minimum prices" to be paid
by all handlers thereof to producers or associations of producers.51
Certain handlers refused to comply, whereupon the government sought
an injunction to compel adherence to the order. It was contended
that the statute and the order issued thereunder violated the Fifth
Amendment; that the act involved improper delegation of legislative
power; that Congress lacked power to enact the legislation under the
commerce clause; that the producer referendum provided for therein 52
was conducted by misrepresentation and coercion; and that the order
47. 3o6 U. S. at 351 (italics supplied).
48. 291 U. S. 502 (1934). See Goldsmith and Winks, note i supra; Horack and
Cohen, After the Nebba Case: the Administration of Piice Regulation (934) 8 U. OF
CIm. L. REv. 219; Hale, The Constitution and the Price System: Some Reflections on
Nebbia v. New York (1934) 34 COL. L. REV. 401.
49. See Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U. S. 522 (1923).
50. 50 STAT. 246 (1937), 7 U. S. C. A. 6oi (939).
51. 49 STAT. 754 (935), 7 U. S. C. A. 6o8c (5) (A) (1939).
52. 5o STAT. 247 (I937), 7 U. S. C. A. 6o8c (i) (939).
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was fraught with unconstitutional inequalities and discriminations,
such as the provision for price equalization.5 3 The district court sus-
tained most of these contentions in relation to the order before it, and
therefore deemed it unnecessary to explore the constitutional basis of
any underlying Congressional power to establish commodity prices.54
Upon this point, however, the Supreme Court, which reversed the court
below, held as follows:
"The authority of the Federal government over interstate
commerce does not differ in extent or character from that retained
by the states over intrastate commerce. Since Munn v. Illinois,
this Court has had occasion repeatedly to give consideration to
the action of states in regulating prices. Recently, upon a re-
examination of the grounds of state power over prices, that power
was phrased by this Court to mean that 'upon proper occasion
and by appropriate measures the state may regulate a business in
any of its aspects, including the prices to be charged for the prod-
ucts or commodities it sells'.
"The power of a state to fix the price of milk has been ad-
judicated by this Court. The people of great cities depend largely
upon an adequate supply of pure fresh milk . . . The power
enjoyed by the states to regulate the prices for handling and sell-
ing commodities within their internal commerce rests with the
Congress in the commerce between the states." 55
Thus, the rationale of the Court seems to be that since the states have
power to prescribe milk prices within their own sphere of action, the
Congress has like power within its own. It was apparently this rea-
soning which produced the following pronouncement:
"Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas concur in the
judgment and opinion of the Court except insofar as the opinion
appears to imply that power of Congress to enact the marketing
law depends upon the use and nature of milk. They do not be-
lieve that we are called upon in this case to indicate, as they think
we do, that there is such a constitutional limitation on the power
of Congress to regulate interstate commerce." 56
However, it was unnecessary for the Court to go beyond the milk
industry in its ruling, inasmuch as milk regulation alone confronted
the Court. Therefore the opinion does not restrict federal power over
commodity prices to milk, so much as it restricts that power to exer-
cise "upon proper occasion and by appropriate measures". The doubt
53. Similar and supplemental regulation by the State of New York is not involved
here.
54. United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., Inc., 26 F. Supp. 534 (1939).
55. 307 U. S. 533, 569-571 (939).
56. Id. at 582.
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of Justices Black and Douglas was probably created by the use of
these phrases in connection with discussion of state power, rather than
of price regulation generally or federal power. Furthermore, the
statement of the principle that "the authority of the federal govern-
ment over interstate commerce does not differ in extent or character
from that retained by the states over intrastate commerce" is some-
what narrower than other recent expressions: "We are not at liberty
to deny to the Congress, with respect to interstate commerce, a power
commensurate with that enjoyed by the States in the regulation of
their internal commerce." 57 To take the narrower statement liter-
ally, would render pertinent an inquiry, in cases arising under other
federal measures such as the second Guffey Act " or under provisions
of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act, 59 as to whether states
may regulate the prices of coal, fruits, tobacco or vegetables;- likewise,
it would be necessary to deny to the Congress under the commerce
clause the exercise of any price regulation with respect to said com-
modities which may have been denied to the states under the police
power. Such denial, however, would be an indirect and illogical method
of judgment. For example, it is quite possible that conditions in a
given industry within a state may render state action arbitrary as an
exercise of the police power in furtherance of public health, safety,
or welfare, whereas a combination of conditions in several states may
amply justify federal action in the same industry in furtherance of
orderly marketing processes in interstate commerce.
This is so obvious that a literal interpretation of the narrower
statement must be discarded in favor of an interpretation which con-
siders its decisional background. Such background compels the con-
clusion that the discussed similarity "in extent or character" of state
and federal power over intrastate and interstate commerce, respectively,
rests in this: just as state power over intrastate commerce is restricted
by the Fourteenth Amendment, federal power over interstate com-
merce is limited by the Fifth Amendment ;'o and "The Fifth Amend-
ment, in the field of federal activity, and the Fourteenth, as respects
state action, do not prohibit governmental regulation for the public
welfare". 61 Thus, each sphere of action has its own test. When pass-
ing upon federal legislation, the issue before the Court is not whether
the states may act, but whether Congress can; this is so fundamental
57. Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, concurring in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S.
238, 319 (1936).
58. Bituminous Coal Act of 1937, 5o STAT. 72 (I937), 15 U. S. C. A. 828 (1939).
59. The Secretary of Agriculture may require adherence to prices filed by certain
handlers. 49 STAT. 758 (I935), 7 U. S. C. A. 6o8c (9) (B) (1939).
6o. GAlT, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE (1932) §§ 87, 88.
61. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 (1934).
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that the Court's reliance upon the Nebbia case in the Rock Royal deci-
sion should not be construed as limiting the federal power to the "use
and nature of milk". It is natural for the Court, when considering
whether federal regulation of interstate commerce is valid under the
Fifth Amendment, to use as precedent decisions wherein the Court
tested identical state measures under the Fourteenth Amendment.
There are other recent examples of this judicial process, 62 and the
Court's recourse thereto does not merit the over-emphasis which the
concurring jurists apparently placed upon it.
But that fears that the decision is restricted to milk are unfounded
is evident from the very recent case of Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands
Canning Co., Inc.63 Certain canners of Florida citrus fruits sought
to restrain enforcement of that state's Growers' Cost Guarantee Act.
This statute authorized the Commissioner of Agriculture, in his dis-
cretion, with the consent and advice of the Governor, to declare the
existence of an emergency in the citrus fruit industry; in such event,
upon the filing of a certain petition by producers and the procuring of
certain agreements from persons not otherwise subject to the act, the
Florida Citrus Commission was directed to determine and record
annually the average reasonable cost per box of producing citrus fruit;
thereupon, every contract with a grower for the purchase of fruit is
held to require the purchaser to pay the grower a price per box equal
to such ascertained and recorded cost. Upon motion for a temporary
injunction (after hearing on affidavits and on evidence offered by the
complainants) the district court held the act unconstitutional and
granted the temporary injunction pending final hearing,64 without ade-
quate findings and conclusions on the sole issues properly before the
court: merely whether the showing made raised serious constitutional
questions and disclosed that enforcement of the act pending final hear-
ing would inflict irreparable damage.
In reversing the decree and remanding the cause for further hear-
ing (if pressed) and findings thereon, the Supreme Court held:
"The appellees' principal attack upon the statute, based upon
the Constitution, centers on its regulation of prices. The mere
62. In United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144 (1938) the Court,
in sustaining under the Fifth Amendment a federal statute prohibiting shipment in in-
terstate commerce of the appellee's deceptive food product, expressly relied on Hebe
Co. v. Shaw, 248 U. S. 297 (igi), because therein a similar state law was sustained
under the Fourteenth Amendment. The same judicial technique was applied in Ken-
tucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R. R., 299 U. S. 334 (937), which relied-
largely on Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U. S. 431 (1936) ; these cases sustained prohibition
of the shipment in interestate commerce, and of the sale, respectively, of certain con-
vict-made goods.
63. 6o Sup. Ct. 517 (1940).
64. Mayo, etc. v. Lakeland Highlands Canning Co., Inc., 28 F. Supp. 44 (D. Fla.
1939).
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fact that the act fixes prices is, in itself insufficient to invalidate
it; [citations omitted] and allegation of that fact does not raise
substantial federal questions. The presumption that an act fixing
prices is constitutional would require the denial of a temporary
injunction, except in extraordinary situations. Findings to sup-
port a conclusion against constitutionality would need to be un-
equivocal." 65
The Court cited as authorities the Nebbia and Rock Royal cases. It
is significant that, with a state measure before it, the Court cited with-
out distinction these two cases involving state and federal statutes, re-
spectively; it is also significant that, although milk and grapefruit are
commodities entirely different in "use and nature", this fact brought
no comment from the Court.
It is believed, therefore, that the majority opinion in the Rock
Royal case does not restrict federal price power to milk and does not
depend on the use and nature of this commodity; the rule simply re-
quires that congressional regulation of commodity prices shall be exer-
cised "upon proper occasion and by appropriate measures". Such pro-
priety depends upon the nature of the interstate commerce in the com-
modity, and the nature of the commodity may often affect the com-
merce therein. Commodity price-fixing by the federal government,
enacted to remove burdens or obstructions in interstate commerce, or
to establish and maintain orderly marketing conditions in such com-
merce, is required to be based upon the existence of evils in interstate
commerce and reasonably related to the remedy of such evils. Of
course, whether the evil exists rests with the Congress rather than with
the Court, but its existence must be at least a debatable question; and
it is the reasonableness, not the wisdom or success, of the remedy
which the Court is to seek.66 Time and again the test has been held
to be whether the means adopted by Congress bear any reasonable
relation to the exertion of a granted power; 67 the Rock Royal case an-
nounces no new rule in this respect.
But both the Rock Royal and Lakeland cases do indicate the sus-
taining of the general program of federal marketing reglation.67a
65. 6o Sup. Ct. 517, 521 (1940).
66. Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495 (1922); see United States v. CaroleneProducts Co., 304 U. S. 144, 151 (1938) and cases cited therein. In H. P. Hood &Sons, Inc. v. United States, 307 U. S.- 588 (1939), it was strenuously contended thatthe facts of the dairy industry did not support certain provisions of the statute.67. United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. I (1936), and cases therein cited. RailroadRetirement Board v. Alton R. R., 295 U. S. 330 (1935), and cases therein cited. Inthe Rock Royal case, the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice McReynolds and Mr. JusticeButler stressed ". . . the absence of Congressional authority to manage private busi-ness affairs under the transparent guise of regulating interstate commerce", citingSchechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935). Id. at 582. Mr.Chief Justice Hughes and Mr. Justice Roberts dissented on other grounds. Id. at 583.67a. The Supreme Court has since declared constitutional the Bituminous Coal Actof 1937. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adldns, decided May 2o, 194o. See notes 58
supra and iii infra.
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II. THE "EMERGENCY" ISSUE
Recent decisions of the Court indicate that commodity price regu-
lation by nation or state does not depend for validity upon the ex-
istence of a grave economic depression or similar emergency.
The Nebbia and succeeding cases under the Milk Control Law
of New York left doubts on this score.0 8 The temporary provisions,
the express emergency clauses and the depth of the economic depres-
sion did not escape notice; and those who believed that the Nebbia
decision had any "emergency" basis found some justification in lan-
guage of certain later cases.09 In the Lakeland case, as a condition
precedent to operation of the Florida Citrus Commission the Com-
missioner of Agriculture was required to declare the existence of an
emergency in the industry and did so; this circumstance received no
comment in the opinion of the Court and none was required, but it
shows the legislative technique of the day.
A somewhat different situation confronted the Court in Milk
Control Board v. Eisenberg Farm Products.7° Here, the state insti-
tuted injunction proceedings to restrain violations of the Pennsylvania
Milk Control Board Law of 1935.71 This measure was "emergency"
legislation by its express terms, under which it was to expire April
30, 1937. The statute was instead repealed on April 28, 1937 by the
enactment of a clearer and more complete scheme of milk regulation
which contained neither "emergency" references nor time limitation.
7 2
This repealer took effect while the Eisenberg case was still pend-
ing in the lower court. However, all proceedings commenced under
the earlier act were expressly saved and continued under the terms of
the later statute,73 and this was carefully noted in the opinion of the
Court.74 Furthermore, in finding the legislation valid under the police
power, the supreme courts of both the state 75 and the United States
cited decisions of the state court 76 based exclusively upon and sustain-
68. Speculation on the significance of an "emergency" is expressed in works cited
note 48 supra. Compare the present writer's remarks thereon, adopted in ANNUAL
REPORT, MILK CONTROL BOARD OF MANITOBA, CANADA (1938) 79.
69. Borden's Farm Products Co., Inc. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U. S. 251 (1936). This
phase of milk regulation received no discussion in Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Ag-
new, 300 U. S. 6o8 (1937) ; but the Virginia statute therein sustained was likewise a
temporary or emergency measure, and the Court so noted. Borden's Farm Products
Co., Inc. v. Baldwin, 293 U. S. 194 (1934).
70. 306 U. S. 346 (1939).
71. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1939) tit. 31, § 684.
72. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1939) tit. 31, § 700J-Iol.
73. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1939) tit. 31, § 700i-1203.
74. Footnote 2 of the opinion. 306 U. S. 346, 349 (1939).
75. Milk Control Board v. Eisenberg Farm Products, 332 Pa. 34, 200 Atl. 854
(x938), reversed on other grounds in the case under discussion.
76. Colteryahn Sanitary Dairy v. Milk Control Commission, 332 Pa. I5, 1 A. (2d)
775 (1938) and Keystone Dairy Co. v. Milk Control Commission, decided therewith;
see also Commonwealth v. Ortwein, 132 Pa. Super. 166, 200 Atl. 859 (1938), likewise
cited by the Court, which similarly arose under the Act of 1935 and was continued
under the Act of 1937, and in which the validity of the savings clause was sustained.
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ing the Act of 1937. Argument of counsel for the state stressed the
inherent characteristics of the dairy industry rather than any tempo-
rary maladjustment therein, and the opinions of both courts were void
of any emergency language.
The legislation before the Court in the Rock Royal case had a
somewhat similar history. This and its companion case 77 involved
the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937.78 However, this
statute had re-enacted and amended certain parts of the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1933 79 as amended, 0 primarily in order to declare
the Congressional intent that such parts remain effective notwithstand-
ing United States v. Butler.1 The declaration.of "present acute eco-
nomic emergency" in the earlier act was amended out by the later. The
provision of the earlier act for its own termination "whenever the
President finds and proclaims that the national economic emergency
in relation to agriculture has ended" 82 was not re-enacted by the Act
of 1937. The Court, although discussing the Nebbia line of cases,
refrained from mention of any emergency aspect which these or the
statute before it may have had.
It would seem proper to conclude, therefore, that recent decisions
of the Court have removed any basis for the contention that govern-
mental regulation of commodity prices is based upon any limited period
thereof or upon any emergency condition. The exercise of such au-
thority, whether under the state police power or under the federal
power to regulate interstate commerce, may be justified by emergency
conditions; but the authority, if justified, springs from such existing
powers rather than from any new right born of the emergency.
88 Con-
ditions--emergency or not, temporary or permanent-must exist to
require or justify the legislative remedy; and within certain limitations
the courts may examine and also re-examine the facts to test whether
the justification existed or continues to exist.
8 4
III. "EQUALIZATION" AS A TECHNIQUE IN COMMODITY PRICE Fix-
ING UNDER GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY
In sustaining the constitutionality of price 85 and marketing 80
equalization, the Court supports another drastic innovation in the rela-
77. H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 307 U. S. 588 (1939).
78. See note 5o supra.
79. 48 STAT. 31 (1933), 7 U. S. C. A. §6oi (1939).
8o. 49 STAT. 750 (I935), 7 U. S. C. A. §6o2 (1939).
81. 297 U. S. I (1936).
82. 48 STAT. 39 (I933), 7 U. S. C. A. § 613 (939).
83. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 (934).
84 Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U. S. 543 (1924) ; cf. Block v. Hirsch, 256
U. S. 135 (1921). See Pennsylvania R. R. v. Driscoll, 330 Pa. 97, 198 Atl. 130 (1938);
cf. Pennsylvania R. R. v. Ewing, 241 Pa. 581, 88 At. 775 (1913).
85. H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 307 U. S. 588 (1939) ; United States v. Rock Royal
Co-op., Inc., 307 U. S. 533 (1939).
86. Mulford v. Smith, 307 U. S. 38 (1939).
COMMODITY PRICE FIXING
tionship between government and industry. For many years, certain
agricultural co-operative associations have engaged in the practice of
equalization between their members. This practice, however, was au-
thorized by the express terms of the contracts between such associations
and their members. With the introduction of state milk control laws,
the practice was continued by virtue of express provisions therein to
the effect that such laws were not to be construed as abrogating such
contracts.8 7 Some state milk control statutes, however, authorized
price equalization by official order or regulation in the absence of con-
tract and were upheld in state courts. 8
Under ordinary marketing conditions, milk producers compete
for outlets which utilize the greater portion of their supply in fluid or
beverage form, rather than in manufactured forms such as cream,
butter or cheese; the milk in excess of fluid needs, i. e., surplus milk,
commands a lower price because it must compete with these manufac-
tured dairy products on a national market which includes shipments
from low-cost production areas distant from urban centers. Not-
withstanding the lower value of surplus milk, the nature of the dairy
industry compels an ever present surplus because the essential, per-
ishable fluid form must be available at all times in sufficient quanti-
ties to accommodate emergency demands by consumers, and because
the peak period of production does not coincide with any correspond-
ing peak in consumption. Therefore the surplus problem 80 is consid-
ered a market-wide problem, rather than that of any particular pro-
ducer not sufficiently lucky to ship to a fluid dealer, or of any single
dealer who may utilize his milk supply in fluid form in a proportion
higher or lower than the average of other dealers in the community.
This variance of situation means that unequal prices are paid and
received for the same commodity in the same marketing area, and
has often resulted in destructive competition with unfair and unhealth-
ful practices attendant thereto.
Methods of alleviating certain effects of the surplus problem in-
clude apportionment among the producers of the price received from
the fluid market, or apportionment of the fluid market itself among
the producers. Such price apportionment or price equalization in any
given marketing area is the requirement that the various dealers who
purchase from producers make payment for such purchases into a sin-
gle pool, from which distribution at a uniform rate (with differen-
87. Typical is the Pennsylvania provision, in the Pa. Laws 1935, No. 43, § ig.
88. Milk Control Board of Indiana v. Crescent Creamery, Inc., 14 N. E. (2d) 588
(Ind. 1938), modified on rehearing, I5 N. E. (2d) 80 (938), appeal dismissed, 59 Sup.
Ct. 87 (1938).
89. Spencer, Surphs Problem in the Northeastern Milksheds (Farm Credit Adm.
1938) Bull. No. 24.
948 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
tials for variation in quality, quantity or location) is made among all
producers. Payments into the fund may vary between dealers because
of variation in the utilization of the supply of each dealer, but pay-
ments to producers out of the fund are uniform without regard to
whether any particular dealer utilized his own supply in the higher
priced fluid form as distinguished from the lower priced surplus or
manufactured form. Thus, dealers utilizing their producers' supply
in fluid form to an extent above the market average pay into the pool,
whereas those whose fluid utilization is below the average would re-
ceive funds from the pool for distribution to their producers.
This proration of price, returns or income had never been tested
in the Court until the Rock Royal case. Here it was strongly urged
that
. .. to carry this principle of contribution to its logical con-
clusion would mean that the wages of the employed should be
shared with the unemployed; the highly paid, with the underpaid;
and the receipts of the able, the fortunate and the diligent, with
the incompetent, the unlucky and the drone".9 0
The closest approach had been the New England Divisions Case,91
which arose under the Transportation Act of 1920.92 An order of
the Interstate Commerce Commission increased the share of certain
New England railroads in joint through rates to the West, based on
the facts that while many roads were receiving ample income, others
could not continue operation without additional funds; that increase
of rates on the latter roads alone might destroy traffic thereon; that
a general rate increase sufficient to relieve the latter roads would afford
others an unreasonably high return. In upholding the order, the Court
held that the reapportionment of joint rates permitted the prosperous
roads to continue enjoying a fair return; that the funds to rehabili-
tate the weaker roads came not from the former, but from public
traffic. Thus, it is clear that the case differed from the Rock Royal
situation, wherein producers ordinarily shipping through fluid outlets
were required to transfer a portion of their lawful receipts therefrom
to other producers, and to do so without regard to whether either
group of producers was earning a fair return or would continue to
earn it.
However, another method of alleviating surplus evils had been
upheld by the Court through the apportionment of markets, as dis-
tinguished from apportionment of price or income in, Mulford v.
go. United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., Inc., 307 U. S. 533, 572 (1939).
91. 261 U. S. 184 (1923).
92. 41 STAT. 456 (920), 45 U. S. C. A. § 131 (Supp. 1939).
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Smith.93  Sustained there were certain provisions of the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1938, authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to
establish marketing quotas among tobacco growers to relieve disorderly
conditions in interstate commerce. Earlier, the proration of oil produc-
tion had been held within the state police power.94 Further, in the
dairy industry, the practice of market apportionment has often been
engaged in by voluntary agreement between dealers and producers or
producer groups ;95 one such arrangement, known as the base-surplus
plan, is the basis of certain conduct attacked in United States v. Bor-
den Co.9 6 as a conspiracy in restraint of trade.
Price apportionment or equalization does not change, limit or
prorate production or marketing; rather, it distributes the surplus bur-
den over the market in terms of dollars and cents instead of pounds or
acres. In sustaining the practice, the Court held:
"It is ancillary to the price regulation designed, as is the price
provision, to foster, protect and encourage interstate commerce
by smoothing out the difficulties of the surplus and cut-throat
competition which burdened this market." 97
All earlier plans for private or governmental stabilization of the vast
New York Milkshed having failed,98 the Rock Royal decision affords
opportunity for a fair trial of federal regulation in that marketing
area.
IV. STATE REGULATION OF COMMODITIES TO BE SHIPPED
IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE
It has been determined that, in the absence of Congressional reg-
ulation, and in enacting appropriate police legislation affecting an in-
dustry generally, a state may prescribe the price paid to producers
for a commodity produced and sold within the state for shipment to
and resale in another state.
With regard to the conflict between state and federal authority
under the commerce clause respecting the price of milk (and other
commodities) produced and sold within one state for shipment to and
93. 307 U. S. 38 (1939).
94. See Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., 300 U. S. 55 (I937). This
case turned upon the unreasonableness of certain orders promulgated by the state agency
to effectuate the policy of the statute.
95, Andes, Problems in the Basic-Surphs Plan in the Philadelphia Milkshed (U.
of Pa. Thesis, 1937) Chap. III; see Gaumnitz & Reed, Some Problems Involved in
Establishing Milk Prices (A. A. A., 1937) 36.
96. 6o Sup. Ct. 182 (1939). See p. 952 infra.
97. United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., Inc., 307 U. S. 533, 572 (i939).
98. See Bennett, Report of Attorney General on the Milk Industry of New York
(1938) 45-55; Report of Joint Legislative Committee to Investigate the Milk Control
Law, filed March 22, 1937.
950 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
resale in another, 9  it is significant to note here the present jurisdic-
tional status, as recently defined in Milk Control Board v. Eisenberg
Farm Products.°° It was there held that price regulation may be
imposed by the legislature of the state wherein the milk is produced
and sold, in the absence of federal regulation; but the state of des-
tination has no such power, under the earlier decision of Baldwin v.
Seelig.
1°1
The milkshed supplying the New York metropolitan market con-
sists of seven states. It has been determined 102 that one of the most
potent factors in the repeal of price fixing under the earlier milk con-
trol laws of New York was the inability to apply the prices prescribed
thereunder to milk imported from other states in competition with that
produced within New York. The market demoralization caused by
the decision of Baldwin v. Seelig resulted in a dramatic appeal by
seven governors addressed to the Secretary of Agriculture of the
United States, seeking relief by the exercise of powers vested in him
under the AAA.10 3  Thereafter commenced a long series of efforts
to perfect a number of varying proposals, with and without federal
action, to reconcile the many conflicting interests which comprise the
world's greatest milk market. While these efforts were being pur-
sued, Pennsylvania attempted to aid its own producers shipping to
New York by applying its price regulations to New York dealers
operating milk receiving stations in Pennsylvania as well as to dealers
operating exclusively within the state. Legal resistance to this pro-
cedure resulted in the Eisenberg case, which was decided against the
state in its own courts 104 as an invasion of the power granted to the
central government in the commerce clause.
These set-backs to regulation by the states and by co-operative
effort, and a number of other factors, drove down producers' prices
in the New York Milkshed to levels which shocked both the dairy in-
dustry and the consuming public. An aroused opinion and the culmi-
nation of earlier efforts finally resulted in approval by milk producers
and by the Secretary of the federal regulation tested in the Rock Royal
99. Polikoff, note 46 supra. See Dickinson, "Defect of Power" in Constitutional
Law (1935) 9 TEMP. L. Q. 388.
IOO. 306 U. S. 346 (1939). See p. 945 supra.
,or. 294 U. S. 511 (1935). See note 45 supra.
102. See note 98 supra.
io3. N. Y. Times, March 27, 1935. Similar demoralization resulted four years
later from the adverse decision of the lower court in the Rock Royal case; pending
appeal, milk producers endeavored to persuade their buying milk dealers to agree to
payment for milk under the terms of the unenforceable federal regulation; see Formal
Opinion No. 277, Claude T. Reno, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, to Howard G.
Eisaman, Chairman of the Milk Control Commission of Pennsylvania, March 13, 1939.
104. 332 Pa. 34, 20o Atl. 854 (1938).
COMMODITY PRICE FIXING
case, establishing producers' prices governing the New York supply
throughout the several states shipping to the metropolitan market.
The advantages of federal jurisdiction in a multiple-state milk-
shed are at least twofold. First, notwithstanding the Eisenberg deci-
sion, as a practical matter it is highly difficult for many administra-
tive agencies in many states exporting to a single market to issue iden-
tical regulations governing each part of such milk produced within
the respective states ;1o5 almost identical price levels would be essential
to prevent destructive competition between the many production areas.
Second, in such a multiple-state milkshed it is clearly beyond the legal
power of any single state to prescribe the equalization method of price
regulation for the entire market: there is a vast distinction between
prescribing a minimum price to be paid producers for milk acquired
by a dealer within the state for shipment without, as in the Eisenberg
case, and requiring such price to be pooled with the proceeds of similar
transactions between producers and dealers in other states, as in the
Rock Royal case. The latter situation obviously falls within that
class of subjects "which are of such a nature as to demand that, if
regulated at all, their regulation must be prescribed by a single au-
thority". 10 6
It the Lakeland case, one of the objections to the Florida Grow-
ers' Cost Guarantee Act was that its application to fruit produced
within the state for shipment in interstate commerce contravened the
commerce clause. Since the disposition of the case at the time did
not require it, the majority of the Court did not discuss this separately.
Long ago, other efforts to regulate the Florida citrus industry had
met such objection. 10 7  Regulation of an industry by a state tends
to be as intensive as the industry is extensive; it is the "paramount"
industry which can command legislative recognition for relief; and
it is such industry which usually depends for sustenance on exports
to consumers in other states or foreign nations. Obvious examples
are Florida grapefruit,0 8 California lemons, 10 9 Georgia tobacco, 10
Pennsylvania coal 111 and Texas oil.1 12  Thus, if the mere fact of
i05. On regulation by Congress where the objective is administratively difficult of
achievement by the several states, see 3 SELECTE ESSAYS ON CoNsTITuTIoNAL LA-W
(938) 13o; Note (1929) 29 COL. L. REv. 321.
io6. Milk Control Board v. Eisenberg Farm Products, 306 U. S. 346, 351 (939).
See also Simpson v. Shepard, 23o U. S. 352 (913) (Minnesota Rate Cases).
107. Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U. S. 52 (1915) ; statute prohibiting sale or shipment
of citrus fruits which are immature or otherwise unfit for consumption.
io8. Mayo, etc. v. Lakeland Highlands Canning Co., 6o Sup. Ct. 517 (940).
io9. Agricultural Prorate Commission v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. (2d) 550, 55 P.
(2d) 495 (936).
IIO. Townsend v. Yeomans, 3oi U. S. 441 (1937).
ii. The Pennsylvania anthracite industry is currently operating voluntarily under
a stabilization program administered by the state's Department of Commerce, various
regulatory measures having failed of enactment by the legislature. Federal regulation
governs the bituminous industry. The Guffey Acts, see notes io, 6i mipra.
112. Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., 300 U. S. 55 (1937).
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exportation defeats state regulation of intrastate activity, the juris-
diction with the greatest stake has the least authority to stabilize an
industry.
In the Eisenberg case the Court noted that "only a small frac-
tion" of the milk produced by Pennsylvania farmers is shipped out of
the state, but it is submitted that this was merely partial evidence of
the "propriety" of local regulation of all milk produced and sold in
Pennsylvania irrespective of its destination; that the Eisenberg rule
may apply (federal regulation absent) even where the greater pro-
portion of the commodity is produced for sale within the state and
exportation beyond the state boundaries. Indiscriminatory regulation
of the price or volume of a commodity produced by a paramount in-
dustry in an appropriate 113 exercise of the state police power, which
regulation is so oppressive as to unduly burden interstate commerce
in such commodity bound for extra-state markets, would also burden
simultaneously the industry of the enacting state which depends on
that very exportation for its own economic and general welfare. "That
the States might be so foolish as to kill a goose that lays golden eggs
for them, has no bearing on their constitutional rights". 114  However,
it is this practical situation which generally causes the trade barrier
obnoxious to the commerce clause to be the creature of an importing
rather than an exporting state. And it is this practical situation which
may cause the geese and the states to turn to federal regulation regard-
less of the constitutional prerogatives of exporting states, in order
to achieve regulation uniform with that of other states similarly sit-
uated.
V. MARKETING LEGISLATION AND THE ANTI-TRUST LAWS
Legislation authorizing price regulation of certain commodities
in interstate commerce has not removed private price restraints therein
from the purview of the anti-trust laws.
United States v. Borden Company 11 5 came before the Court on
appeal from orders of a district court "-6 sustaining demurrers filed
to an indictment for conspiracy to violate the Sherman Act. The
counts before the Court charged conspiracies to fix prices paid pro-
ducers of milk, to fix prices charged for the sale of milk by dealers
therein, and to control the supply of milk; this respecting milk shipped
113. As to inappropriate measures, see the three classifications in Polikoff, note 49
supra, at 7.
114. Erie R. P. v. Board of Public Utility Commissioners, 254 U. S. 394, 410
(1920).
115. 6o Sup. Ct. 182 (1939), (1940) 88 U. OF PA. L. REv. 493.
116. 28 F. Supp. 177 (N. D. Ill. 1939).
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in interstate commerce for sale in the Chicago market. The unique
characteristic of the alleged conspiracy was that certain important pro-
visions thereof merely continued in effect a trade relationship be-
tween the defendants which had been lawfully created under a mar-
keting agreement and license by the Secretary of Agriculture acting
pursuant to the Agricultural Adjustment Act.117 The Secretary with-
drew from the market in March, 1935, but the alleged conspiracy com-
menced in January and continued after such withdrawal. While the
appeal was pending the Secretary re-entered the market with an order
prescribing minimum producer prices, under the Agricultural Market-
ing Agreement Act.""
The district court ruled that the latter act conferred upon the Sec-
retary of Agriculture exclusive jurisdiction over interstate marketing
of the commodities embraced therein, and to this extent removed .such
marketing from the purview of the Sherman Act; that such jurisdic-
tion was vested in the Secretary by the marketing legislation whether
or not he in fact exercised the powers therein conferred upon him;
that therefore the indictment charged no violation of the Sherman Act.
In reversing the district court, the Court held:
"We are of the opinion that this conclusion is erroneous. No
provision of that purport appears in the Agricultural Act. While
effect is expressly given, as we shall see, to agreements and orders
which may validly be made by the Secretary of Agriculture, there
is no suggestion that in their absence, and apart from such qual-
ified authorization and such requirements as they contain, the com-
merce in agricultural commodities is stripped of the safeguards
set up by the Anti-Trust Act and is left open to the restraints,
however unreasonable, which conspiring producers, distributors
and their allies may see fit to impose." :"
Therefore the Borden case crystallizes the intersection-and apparent
conflict-of government price regulation permitted on the one hand
and private price regulation prohibited on the other.
Is it material that price restraints imposed upon commerce by pri-
vate persons have been imposed also, although not simultaneously, by
the Government in fulfillment of a public policy declared by Congress?
This policy, as declared in the Agricultural Act, was the establishment
of parity prices to restore and maintain orderly marketing conditions
in interstate commerce. Such policy of stabilization is often the pur-
pose of private price agreements. Thus, in the case of United States
117. 48 STAT. 31 (933), 7 U. S. C. A. §6Ol; 49 STAT. 750 (1935), 7 U. S. C. A.
§ 602 (1939).
118. 50 STAT. 246 (937), 7 U. S. C. A. § 6Oi (939).
119. United States v. Borden Co., 60 Sup. Ct. 182, 188 (1939), (i94o) 88 U. oF
PA. L. REv. 493.
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v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. 120 a crucial question was whether the dis-
trict judge was correct in charging the jury that an agreement raising
gasoline prices by a group affording buying outlets for distress sales
is illegal per se, regardless of proof that such price maintenance was
consistent with earlier legislative (NRA) and administrative policies
of the Government in relief of surplus problems in the oil industry.
The Court had earlier deemed price restraints by private agree-
ment in violation of the Sherman Act regardless of the reasonable-
ness of the price level thus fixed.121 Probably the farthest that the
Court has gone is to refrain from enjoining operation under an agree-
ment creating a single selling agency for the marketing of coal in
stabilization of the bituminous industry, where the evidence established
that ample competition with other fuels and with non-parties remained
and that a buyers' market prevailed.12 2  The recent case of Interstate
Circuit, Inc. v. United States 123 seemed to emphasize that in the price
combinations there outlawed "it does not appear that the competition
at which they were aimed was unfair or abnormal." 124 But the sub-
sequent case of Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States,125reiterated that
private price agreements are "in themselves unlawful restraints." And
the last word of the Court in the Socony-Vacuumi decision maintains
this position even where such agreements are purposed to continue an
earlier governmental policy of stabilization within an industry.
The Sherman Act was passed, and the "rule of reason" an-
nounced,' 26  before our statute law M  recorded certain drastic
changes 128 in public policy favorable to commodity price fixing. In
120. U. S. Sup. Ct., May 6, 194o. The lower court's decision is found in 1O5 F.
(2d) 809 (I939).
121. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U. S. 392 (1927) ; see United
States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U. S. 371 (1923).
122. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U. S. 344 (1933); cf. Sugar
Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U. S. 553 (1936), as to which see Donovan, The
Effect of the Decision in the Sugar Institute Case tpon Trade Association Activities
(1936) 84 U. OF PA. L. Ry. 929.
123. 3o6 U. S. 2o8 (939). In this case, a divided court condemned a price (theatre
admissions) combination designed to prevent the destruction of the inherent good-
will which made possible continued exhibition of copyrighted moving pictures as first-
run features.
124. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 3o6 U. S. 208, 232 (1939).
125. 6o Sup. Ct. 6o8 (1940). In the marketing of a patented fuel, the defendants
used licensing contracts as a means of controlling jobbers' prices.
126. See Standard Oil Co. of N. J. v. United States, 221 U. S. I, 54 (911).
127. Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, 50 STAT. 246 (I937), 7 U. S.
C. A. §§ 6ol-659 (934) ; and the Acts amended and supplemented thereby: 48 STAT. 31
(I933), 7 U. S. C. A. §§ 6OI-659 (934); 49 STAT. 750 (I935), 7 U. S. C. A. §§ 6oi-
659 (934). See also Bituminous Coal Act of 1937, 5o STAT. 72 (I937), 15 U. S. C.
A. § 828 (1934) ; cf. Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, 49 STAT. 991 (1935),
15 U. S. C. A. §§ 8Ol-827 (934). Miller-Tydings Act, 50 STAT. 693 (937), I5 U. S.
C. A. § i (Supp. 1939).
128. Changes in law and policy were, of course, preceded by recognition of new
problems or new means of solving old problems in agriculture and industry. As to the
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view of the conclusion reached by the Court in the Socony-Vacuum
("Madison Oil") case, it and the Borden decision have focused atten-
tion on one great dilemma of modern business. In many industries,
the complex surplus, processing or marketing problems of country,
plant and street may be summarized in the three words of price, pro-
duction, quality. Yet the three evils which led to the public outcry
against combinations have been likewise summarized 129 as the power
of such groups to fix prices, limit production, and deteriorate quality
to the public injury. Thus, the very three factors which should drive
industry together in efforts to co-operate so as to eliminate or mini-
mize unfair practices and demoralizing, wasteful competition are the
same three factors which may make such co-operation unlawful.
The recent marketing regulation of states and of the nation is
obviously in recognition of this dilemma; tle various enactments rep-
resent an effort to provide economic planning in the interest of mar-
ket stability under governmental supervision, rather than under pri-
vate control as alleged in the Borden situation. But the dilemma also
exists in fields which the government has not entered and probably
never can or will in the directly regulatory sense; and here its recog-
nition must lie in the extent to which self-regulation by industry and
agriculture will merit public confidence.
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CONCLUSION
Industry, agriculture and government are still travelling between
the Scylla of competition and the Charybdis of monopoly. Lanes
charted thus far indicate that in ordinary commodities certain price re-
straints under governmental supervision are deemed consistent with
public welfare, and that private price restraints free of such super-
vision or regulation generally are inimical thereto; but the width and
direction of these lanes still remain undetermined, as does the national
economic horizon toward which they lead. The Supreme Court has
recently held that upon proper occasion and by proper measures the
Congress may prescribe the price of commodities moving in or directly
affecting interstate commerce; that the propriety underlying state or
federal price regulation is not necessarily the existence of an emer-
gency or grave economic depression; that the "equalization" technique
dairy industry, see Polikoff, Powers and Limitations of the Public and Milk Control
Authorities (938) American Cooperation 286; concentration of milk in the hands of
comparatively few milk dealers and cooperative associations was effected mainly in the
I920's. The post-war decade left few industries unchanged, free of concentration, or
without a surplus problem.
i29. See Standard Oil Co. of N. J. v. United States, 221 U. S. I, 52 (i91).
130. See Dickinson, The Anti-Trust Laws and the Regulation of Industry (932)
x8 A. B. A. J. 6oo; Merritt, What the Anti-Trust Laws Should Be (i93o) 147 AwNALs
195.
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in price regulation is not violative of the Constitution where premised
on sound economics for stability of the industry affected; that, in the
absence of Congressional regulation, a state (in enacting appropriate
police legislation affecting an industry generally) may prescribe the
price paid to its producers for a commodity produced and sold within
the state for shipment to and resale in another state; that marketing
regulation authorizing governmental price fixing of certain commodi-
ties in interstate commerce has not removed private price restraints
therein from the purview of the anti-trust Jaws. These decisions grouped
within but fourteen months possess a nexus which emphasizes the
problem of commodity surpluses in "the monopoly issue" 131 as never
before, and which indicates increased legislative and judicial recogni-
tion of the basic agricultural and industrial conditions prompting the
leadership of both government regulation and self regulation toward
stabilization of American enterprise.
131. Richberg, The Monopoly Issue (1939) 87 U. OF PA. L. REV. 375.
